AMPS Current Thinking – North Hyde Substation – Heathrow Outage – Government Response to Neso Report

The document here outlines the UK government’s response to the North Hyde Substation fire, detailing an Energy Resilience Strategy (ERS) and implementation plan to enhance the resilience of the energy infrastructure and ensure reliable energy supply particularly to Critical National Infrastructure (CNI).

Government Response to NESO’s North Hyde Report

The government is committed to enhancing energy resilience in Great Britain following the North Hyde Substation fire incident.

The North Hyde fire on March 20, 2025, highlighted vulnerabilities in the energy system.

NESO conducted a review, leading to 12 recommendations for improving energy resilience (see table 1 page 6 attached).

The Government Response aims to implement these recommendations through a clear plan.

AMPS Note: Action D2 suggests there is a need for new fire standards or specification for energy sites (not just NGSO sites) – this could impact upon large battery systems provided through AMPS Members or the design of large on-site energy centres too.

The ERS will be published in 2026, focusing on long-term resilience.

AMPS note: 3.3.2 Restoration of Energy Customers

In 12 hours all except two of the 66,919 domestic and commercial customers directly supplied by SSEN Distribution had power restored. The two customers which remained off supply were able to utilise their own backup generators for supplies, which proves the value of having robust and effective business continuity arrangements in place. (No doubt other customers only ran their backup generators during the 12-hour restoration period.)

AMPS Note:    Page 21 – report talks of changing the way customers are re-connected to favour Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) – this could mean more opportunities for genset installations as non-critical customers may be off supply for longer.

AMPS Note: Page 24 – mentions the need for CNI customers being better educated on the risks to their power supplies and the importance of back up generation.

AMPS Note: Page 24 – says they will develop and publish a set of generic set of essential business continuity guidelines – something we should be perfectly placed to advise upon

Energy Resilience Strategy Development

The ERS will outline strategic priorities for a secure energy system.

• It will address risks from climate change, cyber threats, and geopolitical tensions.
• The strategy aims to enhance reliability and resilience during the clean energy transition.
• It will include collaboration with critical sectors and society to strengthen energy resilience.

AMPS Note: Page 24 The energy sector developed power resilience guidance following the 9 August 2019 power disruption incident which led to the automatic disconnection of 1.5 million customers, with power restored within 45 minutes. The event highlighted the potential cascading impacts of short-term disruption on other sectors, and the need for sector-specific resilience planning for essential services. Essential services guidance here was developed to address this issue and circulated to CNI sectors via lead Government Departments.

ERG will build on this existing guidance to develop and publish a generic set of essential business continuity guidelines for CNI sites to help ensure business continuity independence, and clear interface arrangements with reliant energy (Gas and/or Electricity) systems.

North Hyde Implementation Plan Overview

The North Hyde Implementation Plan will address NESO’s recommendations to improve energy resilience.

The plan focuses on three pillars:

• resilience of energy infrastructure,
• response and restoration,
• enhancing resilience of critical infrastructure.

A newly established Energy Security and Resilience Taskforce will oversee the implementation.

The plan includes immediate actions to bolster prevention and preparedness for exceptional events.

Lessons Learned from North Hyde Incident

Immediate actions are necessary to address the lessons learned from the North Hyde incident.

The implementation plan will drive improvements across the three pillars identified in the NESO review.

Actions will focus on:

• enhancing asset management,
• maintenance,
• fire safety processes.

The plan aims to reduce the likelihood of future disruptions and improve overall energy resilience.

Enhancing Energy Asset Management

Improving energy asset management is crucial for preventing future incidents. ​

NESO’s report highlighted deficiencies in existing maintenance protocols at North Hyde.

The government will conduct reviews to establish best practices for asset management and risk assessment.

Focus will be on prioritizing critical assets to mitigate risks effectively.

Improving Energy Asset Fire Safety

NESO’s report identified gaps in fire risk assessments and the need for a common approach.

Fire safety measures for critical energy assets will be reviewed and enhanced.

The government will update fire safety standards and regulatory guidance to improve compliance. ​

Mitigating Risk Through Design

The NESO report emphasizes the need for better design standards to prevent fire spread and enhance safety. ​

Design improvements are essential for mitigating risks in the energy system.

The government will review existing design protocols and implement necessary changes to improve resilience. ​

Focus will be on ensuring that new assets are built with security and resilience in mind.

Fire Control Standards at North Hyde Substation

The North Hyde 275 kV substation lacks modern fire control standards due to its pre-existing construction. ​

National Grid Electricity Transmission’s standards now prioritize distance and physical barriers for fire control. ​

North Hyde was built before these standards were implemented, increasing risk.

The energy system has evolved, increasing dependency on power supply for Critical National Infrastructure (CNI). ​

Immediate actions are needed to mitigate risks at North Hyde and similar sites. ​

The ERS will address long-term improvements. ​

Understanding Risks from Historical Design Standards

The review of design standards aims to identify risks associated with older energy assets. ​

ERG will assess existing design standards for extra high voltage substations. ​

The review will explore opportunities for improvement in safety and resilience. ​

Recommendations will inform the ERS implementation. ​

The goal is to ensure energy systems are resilient to evolving risks.

New Design Standards for Energy Resilience

The ERS will evaluate the need for new resilience standards in the energy sector. ​

• A whole-system approach will be taken to assess design standards. ​
• New standards will focus on outcomes to enhance energy system security. ​
• The strategy aligns with the Clean Power 2030 mission. ​

Enhancing Response and Restoration Processes

NESO’s report recommends better liaison between energy operators and CNI sectors during incidents. ​

Improvements in emergency response and restoration processes are necessary for energy infrastructure.

Effective communication is crucial for decision-making during energy disruptions. ​

The North Hyde incident highlighted the need for improved emergency management plans.

Recommendations include developing incident management protocols for CNI sites.

Restoration of Energy Supplies to Customers

Restoration processes for energy supplies need to be consistent and effective across the system. ​

Power was restored to 66,919 customers within 12 hours after the North Hyde incident. ​

The incident revealed challenges in prioritizing restoration for CNI customers. ​

A risk-based approach to restoration will be developed for different customer cohorts.

DESNZ will consider legislative changes to allow differentiated treatment for CNI customers. ​

Enhancing Resilience of Critical Infrastructure

NESO’s recommendations focus on understanding interdependencies between energy and CNI sectors.

Improving resilience of CNI to energy disruptions is essential for maintaining essential services. ​

CNI operators need to assess their energy supply risks and develop continuity plans. ​

The government will work on mapping dependencies between energy and other CNI sectors. ​

A structured approach to energy resilience will be established across sectors.

AMPS Note: Page 26 – Invest in resilient infrastructure: Prioritise secure energy connections and backup power supplies such as batteries, for critical sites from the earliest stages of site development. This statement seems to conflict with the earlier statement that non-CNI sites may have delayed re-connection.

• Integrate resilience

Next Steps for Implementation

The plan will be executed through existing collaborative structures involving industry and government. ​AMPS Note: AMPS have applied to be part of the process

• The UK Energy Security & Resilience Taskforce will oversee the delivery of actions. ​
• The Energy Resilience Group (ERG) North Hyde Task Group will manage energy sector actions. ​
• Regular updates will be provided to the Energy Resilience Leadership Group (ERLG). ​

The goal is to create a safer and more resilient energy system for the future. ​

Summary of Government Response Commitments

The government has outlined specific actions to enhance energy resilience and safety. ​

Actions include reviewing asset management, fire safety standards, and restoration processes.

Deadlines for actions range from Winter 2025/26 to Summer 2026.

Collaboration between ERG, Ofgem, and DESNZ is emphasized for effective implementation.